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Abstract 
Serious deterioration in government fiscal finances in the late 1990s and early 2000s asked for prudent 
fiscal management. The fiscal deterioration of 1990s and 2000s led to elevated levels of debt liabilities at 
both the national and sub-national level. Uttar Pradesh (UP) fiscal position during 1990s and 2000s was 
one of the most vulnerable. Fiscal and revenue deficit and debt levels were appallingly high creating 
unmanageable pressure on fiscal finances. The UP government has enacted its FRBMA in 2004 with the 
aim to arrest rising deficits and debt which mandated reduction in deficit and debt levels within a limit in 
a given time frame. The sustainability analysis has been made in the current study to capture the effect of 
reforms on debt position and to assess sustainability of debts in pre and post FRBMA years. Our analysis 
suggests improvement in all debt and deficit indicators in post 2004-05 years. Debt analysis also confirms 
sustainable fiscal health (τ = -4.533; p<0.05; with constant and trend) during post-FRBMA years. The 
policy implication of the finding is that UP government need to stick with fiscal rules policy.  
Key Words: Debt Sustainability, Sub-national Government, State Finances, FRBM Act, Uttar Pradesh. 
JEL Classification: H62, H63, H72.  
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I- Introduction 
“The history of crisis modeling in international macroeconomics reveals that each successive 
wave of crises exposes possibilities for crisis that were overlooked in earlier analysis.” 
P. Krugman, (2006, 26) 
With the growing literature on public economics, the debate on pros and cons of fiscal debts is 
also growing. It is argued that debts, particularly, fiscal debts are not undesirable, especially, in 
developing countries like India where revenue resources are seriously constrained. There is 
general consensus among the researchers that there is need to contain debt within manageable 
limits (e.g. Maastricht Treaty 1991) rather than eliminating it at any economic cost. Rangarajan 
and Subbarao (2007) argued ‘It must be acknowledged upfront that fiscal deficits are not bad per 
se. In fact, they may be necessary, even desirable in some situations. The issues, therefore, are 
not whether or not there should be fiscal deficit, but its appropriate level.’ Endorsing the 
philosophy of manageable level of debts, there are several studies focusing on finding 
manageable or, particularly, sustainable level of debt at national and sub-national level.  
One distinct feature that has emerged from the recent literature is that the sustainability of sub-
national government (SNG) debts is equally important with sustainability of national government 
debt. The debt sustainability of SNGs is more crucial, especially, in a political setup like India. 
Conuto and Liu (2010) stated three main factors for this escalating importance of SNG debt 
sustainability. First, in the process of decentralization, sub-national governments are increasingly 
entrusted with large expenditure responsibilities with limited freedom to raise revenue through 
user charges or market borrowings. Secondly, state governments are in immense pressure of 
supplying quality social and economic infrastructure elevated from rapid urbanisation and 
catching up by the states in overall development. This has obligated the sub-national 
governments to undertake large borrowings. As debt servicing cost as well as benefits derived 
from the using infrastructure is spread across the generations, thus, the inter-generational equity 
issue comes into the picture.  Lastly, they stated that private capital has become an important 
source of sub-national finances and often compete with bank loans. Therefore, they are 
increasingly influencing the market interest rate.  It is, therefore, sub-national public debt 
sustainability is equally important with national debt sustainability.  
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In the Indian context, the fiscal health, both at the Centre and in the states, had weakened 
progressively since the mid-90s. The combined fiscal deficit of the Centre and the states which 
was 9.3 percent of GDP in the 1990-91 declined to 6.3 percent in 1996-97 before returning to 9.0 
percent in 1998-99 mainly owing to the impact of the Fifth Pay Commission award. The impact 
of year-on-year deficits shows up in the stock of debt and interest payment indicators. The debt-
GDP ratio of the Center and states combined had increased from 64.9 percent in 1990-91 to 79.5 
percent in 2005-06. Likewise, during the same period the ratio of interest payments to GDP had 
increased from 4.4 to 5.8 percent reflecting both higher debt stock as well as higher average 
interest rate (Singh 2004; Rangarajan and Subbarao 2007).  
In Uttar Pradesh (UP) too all the major fiscal indicators showed a continuous worsening of the 
situation in the state during nineties. The burden of interest payment steadily increased and 
accounted for one-fourth of the revenue expenditure by 2001-02. The State was able to finance 
only 40 percent of its total expenditure from its own tax and non-tax revenue receipts, rest being 
financed by central transfers and borrowings. Fiscal deficit remained at an unduly high and 
unsustainable level during the nineties. Revenue deficit, which was around 1.5 percent of GSDP 
in the early 1990s, jumped to 5.1 percent level in 1998-99. Similarly, fiscal deficit increased 
from 4.4 per cent of GSDP to around 6.8 percent during the same period. As a result of the 
continued fiscal deterioration of the government the state slowly caught into a debt trap (Kripa 
Shankar 2001and 2002; Singh 1999 and 2000). The ratio of debt to GSDP in UP went up from 
32.4 per cent in beginning of the decade to around 40 per cent by the end of the decade. In other 
words, the government was falling into a debt trap and was not in a position to service its debt 
from its own borrowing. The debt levels had clearly become unsustainable.  
The unsustainable fiscal health both at the center and sub-national levels necessitated a need for 
positive policy interventions. Following the philosophy of growth inductive fiscal management 
and to reduce stock of debt, Indian government has adopted fiscal rules strategy by enacting long 
awaited Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBMA) in 2003 for prudent fiscal 
management. This act mandated the Central government to curtail its deficits and debts within 
prescribed limits. SNGs were also incentivised to adopt their own FRBMAs. The different 
Finance Commissions have offered various incentives viz. Debt Swap Scheme (DSS) and Debt 
Consolidation and Relief Facility (DCRF) to the SNGs which were linked to their adoption of 
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FRBMA and fiscal performance. Acting in the response, the government of Uttar Pradesh has 
passed Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act in February 2004. It emphasizes the 
need for achieving revenue surplus, attenuation in fiscal deficit and prudent management of debt. 
It envisioned limit on fiscal and revenue deficits as well as on government guarantees. 
Against this background the current study aims to study the fiscal performance of the state 
during 1993-94 to 2013-14 and to assess the sustainability of debt position of the Uttar Pradesh 
government for the same period, especially, in the light of state’s FRBMA. It also attempts to 
look at whether fiscal rules policy (FRBMA) has been successful in reducing debt and deficit 
levels. The rest of the study is organised in the following manner. Section two presents a brief 
review of recent studies on state finances and debt sustainability. In the third and fourth section 
data and methodology has been discussed. In the fifth section, trends of state’s key fiscal 
indicators and emerging trends have been analysed. Section six gives an overview of trends of 
outstanding debt and interest burden of the state government. In the next section, different 
measures to assess sustainability are discussed followed by empirical testing and elucidation of 
results. The eighth section concludes the paper with policy implications.    
Review of Literature 
Sustainability is a term that has been frequently used in the scholastic literature but with different 
connotations under different circumstances (Balassone and Franco 2000, Chalk and Hemming 
2000). This framework was first developed by Domar (1944) which states that a necessary 
condition for sustainability is that growth rate of income must exceed the interest rate. 
Subsequently, Buiter (1985) suggests a sustainable policy as one which is capable of keeping the 
ratio of public sector net worth to output at its current level. Broadly, sustainable level of debt 
refers to the level which can be serviced through future revenue without hampering the 
efficiency and solvency of the government.  
In the context of India, the analysis of debt sustainability assumed critical importance during the 
late 1980s, when sharp fiscal deterioration took place both at national as well as sub-national 
levels. However, most of the studies on debt sustainability in the Indian perspective have tended 
to be confined to the Central government finances or to state finances at consolidated level viz. 
Seshan (1987), Buiter and Patel (1992), Pattnaik (1996), RBI (1999, 2001, 2002 & 2013), 
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Pattnaik, Prakash, & Misra (2004), Jha and Sharma (2004), Rangarajan and Srivastava (2005) 
and Sucharita (2012). Some attempts have been made by scholars to study public debt 
sustainability at sub-national level. Prasad, Goyal and Prakash (2003) were one of the initial 
authors focusing on the debt sustainability of the Indian states. They warned about the pace of 
debt rise and argued the policy responses would only reduce debt by 1-2 percent only. In a report 
submitted to the Twelfth Finance Commission by the Dholakia, Mohan and Karan (2004) 
addressed two main issues: first, defining sub-national debt to bring comparability across the 
SNGs and second, state-wise assessment of debt sustainability. Taking debt/GSDP ratio and 
debt/states own revenue ratio, they found yawning deterioration in SNGs debt position. 
Decomposing fiscal deficit into growth and fiscal behaviour components, they further said that 
fiscal stance adopted by the SNGs was highly unsustainable.  
Similar findings were reported by Rajaraman, Bhide and Pattnaik (2005). They noted a steep rise 
in debt/GSDP ratio of SNGs during 1992-2002. Uttar Pradesh was ranked among the group of 
second category states having high unsustainable levels of debt. Unsustainable levels of debt 
were also reported in Odisha, Punjab and Tamilnadu during the 1990s and 2000s (Rath 2005; 
Sawhney 2005; Ianchovichina, Liu and Nagarajan 2006). In a detailed study, Das (2013) 
assessed debt sustainability of Kerla, Punjab and West Bengal. He found fiscal performance of 
these states fiscally unhealthy, especially, on the revenue account. Except West Bengal, Kerala 
and Punjab attained partial co-integration between debt and deficit which indicated an imperfect 
equilibrium due to slow convergence towards long run equilibrium. However, West Bengal fiscal 
health found to be highly unsustainable with no sign of convergence as no co-integration was 
found in the case of West Bengal. The study pressed for robust fiscal reform programme to 
correct highly unsustainable debt dynamics and to achieve long run equilibrium quickly.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that SNGs have had tough time regarding state finances during late 
nineties and early of 2000s. However, assessing debt sustainability at sub-national level is a very 
complex task. Inability to use seigoniorage finance, legal constraints to employ new taxes to 
raise revenue, lesser control over cost of borrowing and returns and dependence on central 
transfers pose some peculiar set of problems in assessing SNGs debt sustainability. SNGs also 
differ in their fiscal strategies, resource requirements, and level of development necessitating for 
tailor made fiscal reforms for each SNG. It is evident that though, some efforts have been made 
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to capture debt sustainability at the sub-national level, yet, state specific detailed studies, by and 
large, are absent. While the issue of debt sustainability is a concern across all the states, their 
heterogeneity in terms of size, level of income and their financial position measured by various 
fiscal indicators and ability to raise resource on their own calls for varied policy initiatives 
(Rajaraman, Bhide and Pattnaik 2005). However, UP remains less researched state from the 
perspective of debt sustainability analysis. This study is an attempt to fill this void.   
Data 
The data for the current study is taken from the reports Handbook of Statistics on State 
Government Finances – 2010, State Finances: A Study of Budgets for various years published by 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and Finance Accounts of UP government. The gross state domestic 
product (GSDP) data is recorded from the UP Government’s Rajya Aay Anuman (State Income 
Estimates) Reports and Budget Documents. Estimates of fiscal indicators for the years 2013-14 
are revised estimates respectively. GSDP estimates for the years 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 
are revised, provisional and quick advance estimates respectively. Gretl software has been used 
for the graph building and econometric analysis.  
Method 
Different approaches have been used to assess sustainability in different studies. Mainly three 
approaches are very common viz. Domar debt sustainability condition, sustainability indicators 
analysis and budget constraint approach (Buiter and Patel 1992; Khundrakpam 1998; RBI 1999, 
2001, 2002 & 2013; Pattnaik, Prakash, & Misra 2004; Rangarajan and Srivastava 2005; 
Sucharita 2012; Das 2013). Domar debt sustainability condition says that growth of income must 
exceed interest rate on outstanding debt, whereas, sustainability indicators analysis measures 
sustainability taking different revenue and capital account parameters into account. On the other 
hand, budget constraint approach looks at the sufficiency of future surpluses to meet out the 
current stock of debt. Some other methods like tax gap approach developed by Blanchard (1990) 
and Chouraqui et al (1990) was used by Pattnaik (1996), model based approach by RBI (2013) 
and Pattnaik, Prakash, & Misra (2004). In this study debt sustainability of UP government has 
been assessed by applying three commonly used approaches viz. Domar sustainability condition, 
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sustainability indicators analysis and budget constraints approach using Augmented Dickey 
Fuller unit root test and co-integration analysis.  
State of Fiscal Health 
(a) Gross Fiscal Deficit (GFD) 
At the beginning of the nineties gross fiscal deficit for non-special category (NSC) states was 
below 3 percent and in the case of UP, it was about 4 percent. However, after 1994 there has 
been rise in GFD in both UP and NSC states but degree of fluctuation is much higher in the case 
of Uttar Pradesh than NSC states. There was an unanticipated turnaround in the state’s finances 
after the introduction of fiscal rules based budget policy. GFD fell during the period 2004-05 and 
2006-07 indicating State’s commitment to consolidate its fiscal health as mandated by FRBM 
Act. Nonetheless, divergence from the consolidation path can be seen during 2007-10 mainly 
due to Sixth Pay Commission award.  
Figure 1: Gross Fiscal Deficit (as percent to GSDP) 
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Now, when the economy is on the recovery mode, fiscal deficit is declining and it is already 
below 3 percent of GSDP as against the target of 3 percent in the year 2014-15 as per revised 
dates. 
(b) Trends of Revenue Deficit 
On revenue account, the UP government has performed well, revenue deficit turned into revenue 
surplus and the state government managed to maintain it throughout the period starting from the 
fiscal year 2006-07. Moreover, NSC states together with UP have experienced revenue deficit 
since the mid-1990s. The revenue deficit for UP accelerated sharply from 1995-96, when the 
similar acceleration for GFD was found too. A comparison of GFD and revenue deficit shows 
the similarity in the broad trends since 1993-94. The decline in revenue deficit is visible from 
2004-05 onwards. However, fall in revenue deficit was steeper in the case of UP as compared to 
NSC states. This turnaround can be attributed to both receipts as well as expenditure side. While 
receipts have recorded rapid growth and it increases by 5 percentage points approx. during 2004-
05 to 2011-12, expenditures have shown moderate increase of about 1 percent only during the 
same period.  
Figure 2: Revenue Deficit (as percent to GSDP)
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A sharp rise in revenue deficit in 2003-04 was due to inclusion of a state loan given to the UP 
State Electricity Council of an amount of Rs. 12,227.40 crores which has been debited to the 
discount account. Excluding this loan, revenue deficit could have been to 2.78 percent of GSDP 
only.  
(c) Trends of Primary Deficit 
Primary deficit is the result of shortfall of the current year's revenue to total expenditure. It 
shows the extent of current expenditure which government is unable to meet from its current 
revenue, therefore, controllable to some extent. Preferably, state government should generate 
enough primary revenue to service their debt, so that there would be no deficit and fiscal deficit 
will be comprised of the capital outlay only (also known as golden rule of deficit
1
) (for detail see 
Balassone, F. & D. Franco, 2000).  
Figure 3: Primary Deficit (as percent to GSDP) 
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was serious primary deficit in NSC states and UP which moderated during the first half of 2000s 
but rose to high levels again in 2008-09 and 2009-10. However, the recent trends indicate 
moderation in primary deficit, especially, for UP but it won't be easy to achieve the situation of 
golden rule.  
(d) Own Tax Revenue (OTR) 
The declining trend of OTR also worsens fiscal health of the state governments during second 
half of nineties. However, it picked up during 2000s. Moreover, the OTR as percent of GSDP of 
UP is lower than NSC states. It is only after 2008-09 that UP observed considerably better 
revenue performance.  
Figure 4: Own Tax Revenue (as percent of GSDP)
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of 3 to 4 percent. Still, NSC states and UP has shown upward trends of capital outlay after 2009-
10. Capital outlay of NSC states is correspondingly performing poorer than UP. 
Figure 5: Capital Outlay (as percent of GSDP) 
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It is important to note that the reduction in debt and interest burden is effected by two factors. 
First and obvious reason is that fiscal rules policy and better economic performance. The second 
and equally significant is the relief given by the national government through DSS and DCRF 
schemes. 
Figure 6: Total Outstanding Debt (as percent of GSDP) 
 
Figure 7: Interest Payment (as percent to GSDP) 
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DSS was in operation from 2002-03 to 2004-05 only. It was brought to swap high cost loans into 
low cost loans. It enabled SNGs to repay high cost loans contracted from the center, through low 
cost market borrowings and proceeds from small savings. Consequently, loans were swapped 
through additional market borrowing of the state and their net small savings proceeds at the 
prevailing interest rate over a period of three years ending in 2004-05 as per the laid conditions.  
On the other hand the DCRF, recommended by the Twelfth Finance Commission, had two 
components – Debt Consolidation and Debt write-off. Debt consolidation was offered for all 
central loans from the Ministry of Finance taken by the SNGs until March 31, 2004 and 
outstanding as on March 31, 2005 into fresh loans of 20 years to be repaid in 20 equal 
installments carrying an interest rate of 7.5 percent provided SNG concerned enacted its 
FRBMA. Repayments due from states during the period 2005-06 to 2009-10 on these loans were 
eligible for write-off. The total loans of UP swapped during the 2002-03 to 2004-05 amounted to 
` 111.84 billion (16.80 percent of total outstanding debt), out of which ` 61.22 billion was 
through additional open market borrowings and ` 50.62 small savings loans. Additionally, 
during 2005-06 to 2009-10, the UP government was able to consolidate ` 212.80 billion and ` 
71.00 billion were written-off. 
Thus, the comparison of long term trends of financial indicators implies that fiscal health of the 
state, particularly, before enactment of FRBMA was in stress. High fiscal and revenue deficit,  
primary deficit, rising interest liability, slow rise in capital outlay and rising debt burden were 
highlights in pre FRBMA period. Nevertheless, fiscal indicators are showing significant 
improvements since enactment of FRBMA. Another common observation emerged from the 
analysis is that trends in all fiscal variables for NSC states and UP followed the similar path. 
However, despite the downward trend in debt and deficit indicators 'the government's long run 
debt-deficit behavior is fairly a question of stability and sustainability in the fiscal situation' (Das 
2013).  
Debt Sustainability: Analytics and Analysis 
According to the Domar stability condition, to stabilize debt/GDP ratio (d/Y) rate of interest 
should be lower than the output growth (r < g). One of the basic conditions of Domar debt 
sustainability is that the level of primary deficit should remain the same (if it zero) or declining 
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as the fiscal deficit (F) is the total borrowing (net of repayment) required to service inherited debt 
and cover the primary deficit (P) (Rajaraman, Bhide, and Pattnaik 2005). The Domar stability 
condition can be defined as: 
y-r > 0                                           (1) 
r t = (IP) t / (D) t-1                                              (2) 
where:  
 y = Growth of GDP  
 r = Average interest rate 
 IP = interest payment 
 D = Outstanding debt 
 t = Time period   
Equation 1 and 2 imply that the debt/GDP ratio (d/Y) is stable if the GDP growth (g) exceeds the 
interest rate (r) on government debt. As fiscal deficit in a year is the current primary deficit plus 
interest liability inherited on the outstanding debt stock. Thus: 
                               Ft = Pt + i*Dt-1                                                                        (3) 
In terms of ratio of GSDP (for the sub-national governments) 
                                                            
     
            
                                                     (4) 
                                                            
     
     
                                                                 (5) 
Where pt = PD/GSDP in year t 
  n= growth rate of GSDP 
f = FD/GSDP 
Further, the total debt stock is added by the fiscal deficit incurred in a year, thus: 
                                                     
     
            
                                                        (6) 
Taking the above relationship, it can be rephrased as: 
                                             
         
            
 
    
       
                                  (7) 
If the primary deficit is zero, and i = n, the difference between dt and dt-1 will be reduced to zero 
and debt will be stabilised. Thus, with a zero primary deficit, borrowing to pay interest on 
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inherited debt will not raise the debt stock as long as i = n. Reinstating the sustainability 
condition as: 
dt - dt-1= dt-1(i-n)+pt                                                                                               (8) 
The case for debt stabilization is [dt - dt-1=0] and if it is zero. Then, we need: 
       pt
*
 = - dt-1[i-n]                                                                       (9) 
pt
*
 = Stable level of primary deficit 
It means that it is possible to stabilize debt with a positive primary deficit if growth in GSDP is 
sufficient to compensate primary deficit after covering up interest. However, if the interest rate is 
higher than the GSDP growth rate, a zero primary deficit will not be adequate, then, a negative 
primary balance will require for debt stabilization. 
Figure 8: Growth (g) and Interest rate (r) of Uttar Pradesh (in percent) 
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The movements in the average interest rates vis-à-vis nominal GSDP growth reflect that the 
Domar stability condition has been fulfilled for the post FRBMA enactment years since 2004-05. 
Stable level of primary deficit (equation 9) has also been calculated to know differences between 
actual and stable primary deficit.    
Trends of actual vis-à-vis stable primary deficit are in similarity with moments of growth vs 
interest rate. Due to positive gap between g and r, stable primary deficit is higher than actual 
primary deficit during before 1997-98 years and post 2004-05 years, which means state could 
have afforded higher primary deficit than it was. However, here also the period of 1997-98 to 
2004-05 is reflected as period of fiscal stress as high primary surplus was required for 
sustainability of public debts.  
Figure 9: Actual vs Stable Primary deficit (as percent of GSDP) 
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GDP growth and the sufficient condition is that adequate primary surplus should be maintained 
to finance debt services. Indicators analysis addresses these issues.  
(a) Indicator Analysis 
Economists often argue that Domar debt sustainability is a narrow view to look at wide-ranging 
debt sustainability issue. Alternatively, a set of sustainability indicators has been developed to 
review the debt sustainability (Rajaraman, Bhide, and Pattnaik 2005; RBI 2013). In the table 1, 
alternative conditions are set out to capture the different aspects of debt sustainability. The 
potential aspects with their symbolic representation reflected by the alternative indicators have 
also been mentioned in the table 1.     
Table 1: Sustainability Indicators 
Sn.  Indicators Symbolic 
Representation 
Interpretation 
1 a. Rate of growth of GSDP (Y) should 
be more than rate of growth of debt 
(D)  
Y-D>0 
Assess the sustainability in aggregate 
terms and test the essential condition 
that growth of income must exceed 
growth of debt and rate of interest. b. Real output growth (y) should be 
higher than real interest rate (r) 
y-r>0 
2 a. Primary deficit (PD) should not be 
rising faster than GSDP  PD/GSDP<0 
Tests the sustainability from the point of 
view of revenue account. Additional 
condition that primary deficit must be 
declining and sufficient surplus must be 
generated to repay current debt stock. 
There should be positive primary 
revenue balance. 
b. Primary revenue balance (PRB) 
should be in surplus and adequate 
enough to meet interest payments (IP) 
[PRB-IP>0] 
PRB/GSDP>0 
[(PRB-IP)/GSDP] > 0 
3 Proportion of repayments (REP) to 
Gross Borrowings (TGB) should be 
falling over time 
[REP/TGB ↓↓↓] 
REP/TGB ↓↓↓ 
Measures debt trap situation. If the 
interest payment and repayment exceed 
total gross borrowings, economy said to 
be in debt trap. 
4 a. Interest payments (IP) and 
repayments (REP) adjusted for 
primary revenue balance should not 
exceed total gross borrowings (TGB) 
[(IP+REP-
PRB)/TGB]<1 
b. Total net borrowing (TNB) as a 
ratio of total gross borrowing (TGB) 
should be declining  
TNB/TGB↓↓↓ 
5 
 
a. Interest burden defined by interest 
payments (IP) to GDP ratio should 
decline over time 
IP/GSDP↓↓↓ 
Interest payment as proportion to GSDP, 
revenue receipts, as well as revenue 
expenditure should be falling over time. 
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b. Interest payment as a proportion of 
revenue expenditure should decline 
overtime 
IP/RE↓↓↓ 
More resources should be left for 
making payment on other productive 
purposes. 
c. Interest payment as a proportion of 
revenue receipts should fall over time 
IP/RR↓↓↓ 
d.         OD/Y(r-y)-PD/Y<0 OD/GSDP*(r-y)-
PD/GSDP<0 
6 Return on  capital investments (ROC) 
should be equal to or less than cost of 
borrowings (COB) 
[ROC≥COB] 
ROC = IRt/OFAt-1 
Asses the sustainability from the 
perspective of capital account. The 
return on investment must be greater 
than the cost of borrowings. It also 
shows the extent of fiscal susceptibility 
of debt trap. 
COB = IPt/ODt-1 
IRt/OFAt-1 - IPt/ODt-1 ≥ 
0 
Note: IR- Interest Receipts; OFA - Outstanding Financial Assets. 
For the purpose of the sustainability indicators analysis, the whole time period is divided into 
four phases- 1991-92 to 1996-97, 1997-98 to 2003-04, 2005-05 to 2008-09 and 2009-10 to 2011-
12. While first two phases represent pre-FRBM period, on the other hand, the latter two 
represents post-FRBM period. The values are period averages of the different phases. As per the 
sustainability indicators, the fiscal position of UP during pre-FRBM period was unsustainable as 
indicated by most of the indicators. During the pre-FRBM years, real GSDP growth was lower 
than the real interest rate. Against of this, there has been significant improvement in the post-
FRBM years. The compulsory condition of sustainability that GSDP growth should be greater 
than growth of debt and interest rate has been fulfilled during the post-FRBM years. However, 
the additional condition that primary balance to be non-negative has not been met out in the 
whole period of analysis. 
Table 2: Indicator Analysis (Uttar Pradesh) 
Sn.  Indicators Symbolic 
Representation 
1991-92 to 
1996-97 
1997-98 to 
2003-04 
2004-05 to 
2008-09 
2009-10 to 
2011-12 
1 a. Rate of growth of GDP (Y) 
should be more than rate of 
growth of debt (D) 
b. [Y-D>0] 
Y 14.79 8.52 14.40 
15.66 
(13.24) 
D 15.24 15.50 9.24 
8.61 
(8.92) 
Y-D>0 -0.45 -6.98 5.17 
7.05 
(4.32) 
2 Real output growth (y) should 
be higher than real interest 
rate (r) 
Y 4.25 3.38 7.87 6.81 
R 8.67 9.23 6.77 6.03 
y-r>0 -4.41 -5.84 1.10 0.77 
3 a. Primary deficit (PD) should 
not be rising faster than GSDP  
PD/GSDP<0 1.60 2.16 0.67 
0.78 
(0.75) 
b. Primary revenue balance 
(PRB) should be in surplus 
and adequate enough to meet 
PRB/GSDP>0 -1.15 0.50 -3.16 
-3.30 
(-3.25) 
IP/GSDP 2.94 3.86 3.23 2.27 
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interest payments (IP) [PRB-
IP>0] 
(2.27) 
[(PRB-IP)/GSDP] 
> 0 
-4.09 -3.37 -6.39 
-5.57 
(-5.52) 
4 
 
 
a. Proportion of repayments 
(REP) to Gross Borrowings 
(TGB) should be falling over 
time 
[REP/TGB ↓↓↓] 
REP/TGB ↓↓↓ 26.77 28.82 55.21 
34.60 
(39.55) 
b. Interest payments (IP) and 
repayments (REP) adjusted 
for primary revenue balance 
should not exceed total gross 
borrowings (TGB) 
[(IP+REP-
PRB)/TGB]<1 
1.31 0.93 2.12 
1.83 
(1.79) 
c. Total net borrowing (TNB) 
as a ratio of total gross 
borrowing (TGB) should be 
declining  
TNB/TGB↓↓↓ 0.73 0.71 0.45 
0.65 
(0.60) 
5 
 
a. Interest burden defined by 
interest payments (IP) to GDP 
ratio should decline over time 
IP/GSDP↓↓↓ 2.94 3.86 3.23 
2.27 
(2.27) 
b. Interest payment as a 
proportion of revenue 
expenditure should decline 
overtime 
IP/RE↓↓↓ 18.10 22.37 19.30 
12.71 
(12.25) 
c. Interest payment as a 
proportion of revenue receipts 
should fall over time 
IP/RR↓↓↓ 20.47 29.79 19.86 
12.02 
(11.63) 
6 
OD/Y(r-y)-PD/Y<0 
OD/GSDP*(r-y)-
PD/GSDP<0 
155.83 260.65 -54.19 
-30.68 
(-23.18) 
7 Return on  capital investments 
(ROC) should be equal to or 
less than cost of borrowings 
(COB) 
[ROC≥COB] 
ROC = IRt/OFAt-1 5.27 3.50 13.08 
9.61 
(9.86) 
COB = IPt/ODt-1 9.54 9.69 7.16 
6.53 
(6.58) 
IRt/OFAt-1 - 
IPt/ODt-1 ≥ 0 
-4.27 -6.19 5.91 
3.08 
(3.28) 
Note: a. Values in parenthesis are average of 2009-10 to 2012-13.  
Source: Calculated from Finance Accounts, Uttar Pradesh Government and RBI Data. 
On revenue account, though, primary balance is negative but it declined during the third phase, 
however, recorded a marginal increase in last phase due to slowdown in the economy and decline 
in revenue collections. There has been significant decline in IP as percentage of RR and RE in 
post-FRBM years, implying more resources in the hands of UP government as well as reduction 
in committed expenditures. 
The state government has shed-off huge amount of outstanding debt under the legislative 
umbrella of FRBMA as evident from REP/TGB ratio in third phase. It will not only reduce 
future debt servicing but also allow the state to use thus saved financial resources in other 
productive channels.  Moreover, as the basics of financial management says that the return on the 
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investments made by the SNGs should be more than the cost of borrowing, the UP government 
has been successful in converting the difference between these two from negative to positive in 
post-FRBM years. This twist is the outcome of both declines in cost of borrowing as well as 
crucial increase in returns also. Nonetheless, the brought out improvement in fiscal stance 
through FRBMA is delicate as sustainability indicators are indicating trivial deterioration in 
sustainability. The difference between real output growth and rate of interest has also declined in 
fourth phase.  
(b) Budget Constraints Approach  
Sustainability of debts requires that the future primary surpluses must be sufficient to repay the 
current outstanding stock of debt.  As per inter temporal budget constrains criterion, a state 
government’s debt is sustainable if the outstanding debt stock level does not exceed the sum of 
present values of current and future primary surpluses. The government stability can be 
formulated as: 
             
      
 
   
 
   
                                                                                       (10) 
Where dt is debt to GSDP ratio; s is primary deficit to GSDP ratio; r is rate of interest on past 
debt; t for time period.   
Under this approach, the long run equilibrium relationship i.e. testing of the sustainability 
requires a formal econometric test of cointegration between debt and primary deficit. The 
equilibrium, hence, sustainability in the literature involving time series data, requires stationarity 
in the combination of variables (Das 2013; Enders 2009). In this study, the debt sustainability of 
a SNG requires statistical cointegration in debt and primary deficit time series.  
Traditionally, the test of cointegration between time series variables is performed by two 
successive tests for unit root(s). In the first stage, presence of the number of unit root(s) for each 
series individually and order of integration is determined. Generally, the second unit root test is 
performed provided that the variables are contained the same number of unit root(s) in first stage, 
that means, the variables must have same order of integration. If the error series (û) from the 
linear combination of the variables found stationary then the long run equilibrium is said to be 
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existed. The stationarity has been tested by applying the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) Unit 
Root Test on d and p. The results are given in the following table: 
Table 3: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Result: Uttar Pradesh 
Series Model Order 
Lag 
length 
Test 
Statistics (τ) 
5% Critical 
Value 
Shapiro-Wilk 
W (p-value) 
Outstanding 
Debt 
ADF 
(α, t) 
Level 3 -3.0226 
-3.60 
0.927 
(0.0948) 
First Difference 4 -1.77761 
Second 
Difference 
1 -7.6979 
Primary Deficit 
ADF 
(α) 
Level 1 -2.8859 
-3.00 
0.964 
(0.557) 
First Difference 2 -4.8612 
Second 
Difference 
3 -5.9134 
Note: ADF (α, t) means model with constant (α) and trend (t). Lag length is decided by the Akaike/Schwarz criterion 
(AIC).  
As revealed from the results that both variables are non-stationary at level and stationary at 
second-differences. This shows variables are integrated of order two i.e. I(2) which suggests us 
to use cointegration test. Engel-Granger (1987) Cointegration test is used to test long term 
equilibrium.  
Table 4: Engel-Granger Co-integration Test Results 
Indicator Test Value P Value 
τ in Level -2.7634 0.3779 
τ-statistics in Ist Difference -3.0560 0.2405 
τ-statistics in 2nd Difference -7.4904 0.0003 
Critical Value 5% 4.11 
Critical Value 10% 3.73 
Co-integration result No-cointegration 
 
The Engel-Granger Cointegration regression results are depicted in table 4. UP has been failed to 
achieve super consistency, even, partial cointegration also in the debt and deficit variables.  
Thus, as per cointegration results UP is far from attaining long run equilibrium. Therefore, the 
debt position of the state found to be highly unsustainable under the case of strong sustainability 
(Pattnaik, Prakash, and Misra 2004). The unsustainable fiscal health of the state can be justified 
by high debts and deficits, high interest liability, slow growth in own tax revenue and creeping 
capital outlay during 1994-95 to 2004-05 period.  
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Figure 10: Trends of Debt and Deficit- 2005-14 
 
However, post 2004-05 trends offers a hope that the adoption of fiscal rules strategy is beneficial 
as outstanding debt series (2004-05 to 2013-14) found to be stationary at level (τ = -4.533; 
p<0.05; with constant and trend). Other fiscal indicators too corroborate the improvement in 
fiscal health of UP government during the same period. 
Conclusion 
The study presents an overview of key fiscal trends of UP government and NSC states. 
Sustainability of debt has also been tested by three alternative methods – Domar debt 
sustainability, indicator analysis and budget constrain approach. Our analysis of major fiscal 
trends depicts an unhealthy state of affairs upto 2004-05. However, after 2004-05 indicators have 
shown significant improvement in fiscal health of the state. Yet, it has been seen that it is highly 
amenable to external shocks like economic slowdown, pay commission awards. The post 2004-
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05 fiscal performance seems to suggest that fiscal rules policy has positive policy intervention on 
fiscal spectrum of the UP and NSC states.  
The results of different approaches give a mix picture. Domar debt sustainability condition is 
satisfied for the whole period except for 1997-98 to 2004-05. However, indicator analysis 
indicates weak sustainability as condition of zero or primary surplus is not fulfilled for any of the 
four sub-periods. On the other hand, cointegration test indicates absence of long run equilibrium 
which means long run debt sustainability has not been found in the case of UP government. 
However, radical changes in the fiscal health of the government are apparent during post-
FRBMA years and some of the changes are noteworthy like continuous surplus on revenue 
account since 2006-07, bringing fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GSDP (as mandated by FRBMA), 
falling primary deficit, reduction in outstanding liabilities of the state, thereby, reducing the 
burden of interest payment on the exchequer. This is further substantiated by Domar debt 
sustainability condition, indicators analysis and stationarity testing which shows preliminary 
signs of long run sustainability of debt levels.   
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that –first, serious deterioration took place in the fiscal health 
of the state starting from the first half of the 1990s to 2004-05, thereafter, steady improvement 
has been seen in the fiscal indicators; second, broad trends in fiscal indicators of the UP are 
similar to NSC states. Along with this, one common conclusion can also be drawn, which is also 
confirmed by trends in fiscal indicators as well as sustainability analysis, that after introduction 
of fiscal rules policy (FRBMA), state health improved considerably. Policy implications of the 
finding implicate that UP and other state governments need to stick with fiscal rules policy with 
better debt management as it will not only reduce debt stock but also loosen money for other 
productive activities. However, deficits should not be reduced on the cost of lower capital outlay.   
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